Science and Public Controversy: Editor's Introduction by Forbes, Curtis
Science and Public Controversy: Editor’s Introduction
Author(s): Curtis Forbes
Source: Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of
Science, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2011) 1-4.
Published by: The University of Toronto
DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v5i1.15622
E D I T O R I A L O F F I C E S
Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology
Room 316 Victoria College, 91 Charles Street West
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1K7
hapsat.society@utoronto.ca
Published online at jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/SpontaneousGenerations
ISSN 1913 0465
Founded in 2006, Spontaneous Generations is an online academic journal published
by graduate students at the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science
and Technology, University of Toronto. There is no subscription or membership fee.
Spontaneous Generations provides immediate open access to its content on the principle
that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of
knowledge.
F D
Science and Public Controversy
Editor’s Introduction∗
Curtis Forbes†
Scientific claims implicitly invite criticism. While we might expect that
challenging an epistemic authority in religious circles would be seen as an
illegitimate activity (e.g. heresy) and met with suppression, challenging an
epistemic authority in scientific circles is supposed to be a legitimate form
of engagement, and should (ideally) be met with reasoned argument based in
empirical evidence. Given this implicit invitation to challenge scientific claims,
and the sweeping knowledge claims oen made by today’s scientists, it is
hardly surprising that people outside narrowly defined scientific communities
(i.e. science’s “public”) oen challenge the truth of scientific consensuses. The
scrutiny of scientific claims by non-scientist members of the public is quite
understandable and in many ways unobjectionable, given the role that science
advice increasingly plays in our society’s governance structures and public policy
making. As scientists increasingly play policy-maker, they become doubly subject
to public criticism: first as a scientist making substantive claims about reality
and second as public-interest decision-maker making important decisions about
public policy. Thus, for the scientist’s social role as epistemic authority to remain
justified, public criticism of science should ideally be entertained and answered
by practicing scientists.
But as anyone familiar with the social practice of science can tell you,
things rarely go “ideally” when actually practicing science. For whatever reasons,
the history of science is replete with examples of protracted, unexpected,
and unresolved controversies erupting across the scientist/non-scientist divide,
making it seem almost inevitable that such controversies will erupt, drawing
scientists outside of their narrowly defined epistemic communities and into
a more “public” seing. This apparent inevitability of public controversy
surrounding scientific knowledge claims may signal an opportunity for the
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historian, sociologist, or philosopher of science to learn something about the
nature of science. Accordingly, this issue of Spontaneous Generations is dedicated
to studying public controversies over science in the hopes of learning a lile more
about the nature of (and possibilities for) modern scientific practice, existing as
it does within a social and political context full of variegated peoples, disputes,
agendas and institutions.
Public controversies surrounding science take many forms, from
contemporary debates about climate change to historic debates that pied
traditional histories against newer, archeological or geological histories. Two
approaches to studying public controversies are broadly represented here. On
the one hand we have articles that seek, in one way or another, to understand
public controversy over science in terms of communication media. B
L’s piece, for instance, details the early motivations for developing
periodicals as a means of making controversy digestible to the Victorian masses.
In his view, “the development of a mass reading audience in mid-nineteenth
century Britain transformed the very nature of scientific controversy” (p. 5).
Indeed, he argues, that it was during the nineteenth century that public scientific
controversies “became possible for the first time.” Focussing on the example
of evolutionary theory, Lightman shows how periodicals became a place for
resolving scientific controversy, pointing out the new risks that came with placing
scientific controversy in public view. For although “a non-specialized journal
could provide the public space necessary for reaching the reading audience,
maintaining scientific authority in such a site was somewhat problematic” (p. 5).
Complementing Lightman’s piece is the one by B R, which looks
at some of the early justifications for peer scrutiny and self-censorship among
members of the Hartlib circle. He argues that a “prehistory” of peer review shows
a partial origin in the idea—shared by Comenius and others from the Hartlib
circle—that peer reviewwould permit the resolution of disputes outside the public
eye, thereby avoiding or at least reducing the kind of doubt, error, confusion,
and disruption of the social order that could result from more public forms of
disputation. Like their associates in the Hartlib circle, many early fellows of the
Royal Society seem to have been aware of these considerations, as their use of
peer review seems “designed to shield from public view technical arguments,
disagreements, and partially developed or imprudent theses—‘dirty laundry’ that,
if exposed to view, had the potential to prejudice the public or the royal patron
against the fledgling institution” (p. 16). As such, these early advocates of peer
review anticipated many of the very difficulties that Victorian scientists found
when periodicals brought scientific disputes outside the protective walls erected
by peer review and exclusive scientific societies.
On the other hand, we have articles that aack a particular controversy head
on: this is the approach taken by E F K and J M, who
address the scientific and public controversies surrounding climate science and
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stem cell research, respectively. Speaking from a more philosophical perspective,
Keller argues against the idea that, to bridge the public/science climate gap, the
public needs to become more science savvy. She turns this popular argument on
its head: under Keller’s diagnosis, the growth of public skepticism surrounding
climate science, and the resultant failure of policy to mesh with reality, can be
partially blamed on scientists’ failure to see answering public criticism as part of
their job description. Climate scientists, she notes, have never made it a priority to
rebut criticism in public venues—when the narrowly-defined scientific community
(e.g. the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) reaches consensus, that is
usually sufficient to satisfy a scientist’s sense of duty, qua truth-seeker. But given
how important science is in modern policy-making, this is an insufficient sense of
duty. Keller argues forcefully that scientific training should be expanded to reflect
the social expectations of scientists: that they will explain the science to us, and
become epistemic guides rather than isolated authorities.
Taking a distinctly historical approach, Maienschein details the ways that
popular (mainly Christian) and scientific (mainly embryological) definitions of
“embryo” have departed from one another over time. Maienschein argues that
today’s public controversies over stem cell research have resulted from our
lack of shared understanding about embryos. While developmental biologists
have managed to construct a very good understanding of many aspects of
embryological development, they have not worked to make that understanding
the publicly-accepted one. Instead, prevailing social understandings of embryos
are derived mainly from a nineteenth-century Papal decree that seems to care
lile about the biological advances in understanding embryological development.
S S V’s piece is the only one that seems to take both
approaches simultaneously, looking at the role that both media and science
played in resolving controversy over earthquakes in Kerala, India. Popular media
oen play a crucial, whistleblower role in linking the public with science, and
Varughese find the interplay between science and the media most interesting
when trust in science breaks down during post-disaster scenarios. Varughese uses
the case of micro-earthquakes in Kerala to argue that the popular media can
also initiate and maintain public controversies over scientific competence by, for
example, generating “public skepticism over the competence of earth science to
convincingly explain the phenomenon and address the questions raised by the
public” (p. 37).
Historians and philosophers of science walk a very interesting line between
science and their wider publics. Very few HPSers are practicing scientists, though
many have scientific training in one form or another. At the very least, most
of us find ourselves somewhere on the outside of scientific practice. But at the
same time, our historical and philosophical interest in science makes us far more
familiar with scientific methods, results, and practice thanmost non-scientists, and
far beer equipped to think through the complexities of scientific controversies.
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As such, HPS offers an appropriate position from which to navigate and analyze
disputes between scientists and members of the “public.” This is what this focused
discussion section has been dedicated to demonstrating. The articles in this issue
by no means offer comprehensive analyses of how controversy between or across
science and public life are generated or resolved—indeed, a reasonable working
hypothesis is that the generation and resolution of such controversies are highly
heterogenous processes. These articles should, however, serve as testament to the
interesting historical and philosophical work that can be done by focussing on
public controversy as a salient aspect of scientific living.
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